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Detection and Prevention of Process Disruption Attacks in the Electrical Power Systems using MMS Traffic: An EPIC Case
arXiv:2601.03690v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Smart grids are increasingly exposed to sophisticated cyber threats due to their reliance on interconnected communication networks, as demonstrated by real world incidents such as the cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid. In IEC61850 based smart substations, the Manufacturing Message Specification protocol operates over TCP to facilitate communication between SCADA systems and field devices such as Intelligent Electronic Devices and Programmable Logic Controllers. Although MMS enables efficient monitoring and control, it can be exploited by adversaries to generate legitimate looking packets for reconnaissance, unauthorized state reading, and malicious command injection, thereby disrupting grid operations. In this work, we propose a fully automated attack detection and prevention framework for IEC61850 compliant smart substations to counter remote cyberattacks that manipulate process states through compromised PLCs and IEDs. A detailed analysis of the MMS protocol is presented, and critical MMS field value pairs are extracted during both normal SCADA operation and active attack conditions. The proposed framework is validated using seven datasets comprising benign operational scenarios and multiple attack instances, including IEC61850Bean based attacks and script driven attacks leveraging the libiec61850 library. Our approach accurately identifies attack signature carrying MMS packets that attempt to disrupt circuit breaker status, specifically targeting the smart home zone IED and PLC of the EPIC testbed. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in precisely detecting malicious MMS traffic and enhancing the cyber resilience of IEC61850 based smart grid environments.
Abstract: Smart grids are increasingly exposed to sophisticated cyber threats due to their reliance on interconnected communication networks, as demonstrated by real world incidents such as the cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid. In IEC61850 based smart substations, the Manufacturing Message Specification protocol operates over TCP to facilitate communication between SCADA systems and field devices such as Intelligent Electronic Devices and Programmable Logic Controllers. Although MMS enables efficient monitoring and control, it can be exploited by adversaries to generate legitimate looking packets for reconnaissance, unauthorized state reading, and malicious command injection, thereby disrupting grid operations. In this work, we propose a fully automated attack detection and prevention framework for IEC61850 compliant smart substations to counter remote cyberattacks that manipulate process states through compromised PLCs and IEDs. A detailed analysis of the MMS protocol is presented, and critical MMS field value pairs are extracted during both normal SCADA operation and active attack conditions. The proposed framework is validated using seven datasets comprising benign operational scenarios and multiple attack instances, including IEC61850Bean based attacks and script driven attacks leveraging the libiec61850 library. Our approach accurately identifies attack signature carrying MMS packets that attempt to disrupt circuit breaker status, specifically targeting the smart home zone IED and PLC of the EPIC testbed. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in precisely detecting malicious MMS traffic and enhancing the cyber resilience of IEC61850 based smart grid environments.
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